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Abstract
Firms in the sharing economy typically offer higher
flexibility but lower security of working conditions. In
response to challenges from suppliers and policy
makers, several platform companies are reconsidering
their approach. This study examines the effects of
offering sharing economy suppliers a menu of contract
options, differentiated by varying levels of flexibility,
security, and information transparency on their
willingness to work for a platform. We focus on
ridesharing, one of the largest sectors in the sharing
economy, but the insights translate to other segments
of this emerging sector. Using a discrete choice
experiment, we find drivers’ willingness to work for
ridesharing generally increases when the platform
offers diversified combinations of flexibility, security,
and transparency. We also find evidence that
suppliers’ preferences to participate in the sharing
economy are influenced by the working conditions in
their alternative employment options.

1. Introduction
Innovative platform businesses are transforming the
nature of employment relations and the working
conditions of suppliers. Often referred to as the
“sharing economy,” this emerging class of activities
comprises a broad range of services that are based on
shared access to assets (e.g., apartments, cars), skills
(e.g., consulting, crafts, driving), or both (e.g.,
ridesharing) [17]. These platforms serve as a digital
intermediary between suppliers (e.g., Uber drivers,
Airbnb hosts) and consumers (e.g., Uber passengers,
Airbnb guests). To maintain a sustainable platform
business, managers must design user-friendly ICT
interfaces and develop a critical mass of supply and
demand on the platform [43]. But with increasing
competition and regulations in the space, building a
sustainable, profitable platform business is a challenge.
The platform economy typically provides higher
flexibility for suppliers, but it offers lower security
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than standard employment. Platform owners typically
treat suppliers as independent contractors rather than as
employees. Using court and legal challenges as well as
strikes, Uber and Lyft drivers have protested to
demand better job security. Legal measures to improve
the standing of drivers have been adopted in several
states and countries and more are pending. Given these
and other challenges, platforms have yet to generate
profits.
One of the challenges in the sharing economy is to
secure the level and diversity of supply of services
demanded by consumers. Understanding the
motivations and deterrents of suppliers is essential to
attract them and to scale the operation. There is
evidence that the value placed on the flexibility of
where and when to work [21], lower entry barriers for
suppliers than in traditional labor markets, and the
improved ability to monetize skills and resources are
the main reasons for the fast influx of participants into
the sharing economy. However, irregular work, fast
changing business structures, and incomplete
legislation may create uncertainty as to the
sustainability of income and the longevity of jobs.
These factors may reduce the willingness of suppliers
to offer their service in a platform.
To secure participation by the required number of
suppliers, firms must develop governance models that
balance these competing factors. This requires a good
understanding of suppliers’ heterogeneous preferences
for flexibility and security to efficiently minimize
conflicts, reduce negotiation costs, and eventually
grow and sustain service supply. While there has been
substantial attention on adoption of sharing economy
services by consumers, the role of flexibility and
security for suppliers of services in the platform
economy has received only limited attention in prior
research.
In addition to flexibility and security, we
investigate unique information features that are
exclusively available in digital platforms. Since a
platform is a marketplace where suppliers make work
decisions, design of transparency strategies may
influence the willingness of suppliers to work with the
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platform. While prior studies on transparency in IS
have primarily focused on B2B [49] or B2C [19, 20]
relationships, the effect of participants’ information
transparency in P2P markets has not been fully
examined. To reduce these gaps, our study aims to
answer the following research questions:
1) How do flexibility and security of working
conditions affect the willingness of suppliers to work
with a sharing economy platform?
2) How do information features that are available
only on a digital platform affect the willingness of
suppliers to work with the platform?
This study focuses on ridesharing services, one of
the largest segments of the sharing economy. Using
discrete choice experiments, we examine factors
related to the information features of the platform and
the design of the work conditions, particularly the
balance of flexibility and security on the decision to
work. Moreover, we explore the relationship between
the decision to offer services in a platform and the
flexibility and security of alternate job options. This
study expands extant research on the sharing economy
and on platform governance. It also contributes to one
perspective in labor economics that asserts a positive
relationship between flexibility and security (referred
to as “flexicurity”). To our best knowledge, this is a
first study investigating the effects of offering different
levels of flexibility and security on the willingness to
supply services in a platform. The findings shed light
for platform businesses in general, including space
rental, food delivery, and errand services platforms.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
The next section reviews relevant studies on platform
governance, information transparency, and flexicurity
to then develop key testable hypotheses. We then
describe the data and research design, and report
results. The concluding section discusses contributions
and suggests future directions for research.

2. Institutional and theoretical foundations
2.1. Platform governance in the sharing
economy
The IS field uses the term “platform” in multiple
research contexts. Accordingly, several concepts of
“platform governance” have been proposed (e.g., [11,
18]). Summarizing common traits of platform
governance described in the prior literature [29],
platform governance is “a multi-dimensional concept”
controlling dynamically managed decision-making
processes in a platform ecosystem [7, 38, 45], by using
a structure, power, processes, and mechanisms [45].

Tiwana [44] implies that the purpose of platforms is
to organize and coordinate wealth creation. Parker,
Van Alstyne, and Choudary [35] clarify that the
purpose of good platform governance is “to create
wealth, fairly distributed among all those who add
value.” To achieve such fairness, platform owners must
resolve conflicts among stakeholders of the platform
community. As conflicts to distribute the newly created
wealth may aggravate undesirable digital inequality
[13, 22], the importance of good governance has
become an important focus.
While there exists substantial research on
governance of a platform’s owner-developer
relationship [10, 39, 45] and owner-consumer
relationship [24, 37], the owner-supplier relationship
has not been investigated in comparable detail [29].
Prior studies of platform businesses have examined
laws [31], norms [16], architecture [36], and pricing [4,
47, 48] as means of platform governance [35].
Recently, contracts governing relations among
participants in the platform ecosystem have received
increasing (but still limited) attention [10, 30].
Conceptually, this study analyzes contracts as a tool of
platform governance that may be employed to manage
conflicts and reconcile tensions between platform
owners and suppliers, in line with ideas suggested by
platform cooperativism [41].
In the case of ridesharing services, platform owners
delegate to suppliers the decision on when and where
to work. In turn, suppliers delegate to the platform
owner the decision on whom they provide their service
to or the access to a resource, as well as the payment
amount. This attribution of decision making creates
potentially difficult incentive problems. In the
prevailing competitive work environment, sharing
economy suppliers may need to accept lower
compensation [32] and lower protection [15] than
traditional jobs. As a result, suppliers may be relatively
worse off, and in the long term, economic disparity
may deepen [8, 42]. Thus, the role of working
conditions as a key factor to influence suppliers’ utility
and to attract and retain them in a platform remains an
important issue to be researched.

2.2. Information transparency and platform
design
Managing information transparency has become
easier as ICT advances. Firms may utilize transparency
strategies when designing a digital platform to draw
more suppliers and consumers. The transparency
strategy includes not only revealing but also concealing
information to participants.
Prior studies in IS have mainly investigated B2B or
B2C markets [12, 20, 49]. In B2B and B2C markets,
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information of products, prices, inventory, cost, or
process is typically disclosed by suppliers or firms to
consumers or competitors [20]. In P2P sharing
economy markets, suppliers also want to receive
information about consumers because there is a risk
involved in sharing access to their properties. Thus,
platform owners disclose consumer information to
reduce information asymmetry and establish trust of
the digital marketplace [40].
In the sharing economy, platform owners have to
handle participants’ concerns about misuse of private
information which can be exposed as they receive or
provide services [2]. In particular, firms may conceal
certain information to relieve suppliers’ privacy
concerns. The key is to provide an effective means of
communication between suppliers and consumers that
creates a trustworthy environment that suppliers and
consumers perceive as efficient and safe to transact.

to more proactively change jobs, contributing to
flexibility in the labor market.1
Whereas much of the flexicurity discussion focuses
on employment flexibility and income security at the
labor market-level, this study utilizes the concept to
investigate individual-level interactions. As many
suppliers hold other jobs, we explore how the
flexibility and security of an individual’s job outside
the sharing economy relates to activities in the sharing
economy. For example, if a sharing economy platform
structures contracts so a supplier can make choices to
balance work flexibility and security, it may
compensate for the lack of flexibility or security in the
supplier’s main alternative job. In this way, the sharing
economy job may increase the overall perceived
flexibility and security, so the supplier does not have to
relinquish one of the two.

2.3. Labor supply and flexicurity

3. Conceptual framework and hypotheses
development

Many suppliers in the sharing economy hold other
jobs. Thus, in addition to the role of flexibility and
security in the sharing economy, a potential interaction
exists with these other jobs. In traditional labor
economics, individual labor supply is the outcome of
two interrelated decisions: whether to work at all, and,
if so, for how long. The opportunity cost of leisure,
wealth, and preferences are usually regarded as the
most important components in decisions to work [14].
The wage rate is considered the opportunity cost of one
hour of leisure, and total income is often a proxy for
total wealth [14]. Workers’ preferences for other
aspects like types of industry, flexibility of work hours,
and benefit plans may vary depending on individual
demographic factors such as age, educational
attainment, and household income.
Job flexibility and security have long been studied
as major institutional aspects influencing a decision to
work. There are two different perspectives on the
relationship between job flexibility and security: the
trade-off theory and the flexicurity hypothesis, initially
proposed in the context of labor reforms in the
Netherlands and Denmark in the late 1990s [6, 32].
The first view posits that a negative relationship exists
between the degree of flexibility and security. In other
words, a higher level of flexibility can only be reached
by reducing the degree of job security. The flexicurity
hypothesis sees the relationship between flexibility and
security as positive [28]. For example, a generous
income security policy motivates risk averse workers

Starting from gaps in research on the sharing
economy, platform governance, and the flexicurity
thesis, we examine ridesharing suppliers’ preferences
for different combinations of labor contract conditions
using an online choice experiment. Figure 1 depicts the
set of questions explored in this study.
The hypothetical contract conditions, which may
influence perceived flexibility and security and
eventually affect suppliers’ willingness to work, were
identified through a multi-pronged approach, including
a review of the literature on job satisfaction (e.g., [1, 3,
5]), recent public discussions regarding ridesharing
(e.g., [9, 50]), six interviews, and 47 surveys of
ridesharing suppliers and a ridesharing expert.
Considering that the capacity of the human brain to
compare permutations of choice options with multiple
attributes is limited, only the seven most salient
attributes were included in the choice sets. A set of
attributes is composed of both contractual and
information transparency design dimensions of
ridesharing services. Contractual conditions include
options that are currently not offered by ridesharing
services. To obtain an estimate of drivers’ perceived
value of information transparency, we also include
important information features of ridesharing apps that
would not be readily available if a supplier chose
another platform.
1

Although there are a variety of opinions concerning the most
effective components and formula of the flexicurity concept
depending on countries and economic circumstances, the core notion
is the complementarity of flexibility (e.g., employment flexibility)
and security (e.g., income security).
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work for a minimum number of hours within a
specified period reduces flexibility for suppliers.
Suppliers may be willing to accept the arrangement if
platform owners offer better benefits in exchange.
However, without such an offset, the requirement will
likely reduce the willingness to work for platform.
Thus, we hypothesize:
H1. Requiring minimum work hours is negatively
associated with suppliers’ willingness to work.

3.2. Employment security features

Figure 1. Framework and hypotheses

Attribute

Option Option
1
2

Minimum required
driving hours per week

40
20
hours hours

Health insurance
The ride-sharing company provides your
Yes Yes
health insurance with average coverage.
Retirement
The ride-sharing company matches all or
Yes Yes
some of your retirement plan.
Minimum wage guarantee
The company covers the difference between
Yes No
your hourly earning and minimum wage if your
acceptance rate is higher than 80%.
Passenger rating system
You can evaluate a passenger after providing No
No
a ride.
Substitute phone numbers
Your phone number is disclosed when you
No
No
communicate with passengers
Auto insurance deductible
The company offers an insurance policy with a
$1000 $2500
$1,000 or $2,500 deductible and a $1 million
of a total coverage for ride-sharing

c I would drive with Option 1
c I would drive with Option 2
c I would not drive with either option

Figure 2. Example of a choice set

3.1. Flexibility features
Our first hypothesis addresses the relationship
between the level of flexibility and the intention to
work. A requirement imposed by the platform owner to

The second set of hypotheses explores whether
offering
contractual
attributes
that
improve
employment security can increase a supplier’s
willingness to join the platform. Whether drivers earn
the minimum wage while working for ridesharing
platforms is controversial. It has stimulated persistent
debates and collective actions by drivers. Prior
research [50] reports that 74% of drivers make less
than the minimum wage in certain U.S. states. Given
these concerns, a guaranteed minimum wage may
increase the willingness of drivers to work.
H2a. Guaranteeing a minimum wage is positively
associated with suppliers’ willingness to work.
We also examine the effect of offering a health
insurance or retirement plan, sponsored by the
ridesharing company. Such plans are not currently
offered by most ridesharing platforms [37]. Previous
research finds that health insurance and retirement
plans increase job satisfaction [1, 3]. Thus, offering
health insurance and a retirement plan with matching
contributions by the ridesharing company may increase
drivers’ willingness to work.
H2b. Offering a health insurance sponsored by the
ridesharing company is positively associated with
suppliers’ willingness to work.
H2c. Offering a retirement plan with matching
contribution by the ridesharing company is positively
associated with suppliers’ willingness to work.
Another security feature of ridesharing is the auto
insurance deductible. For example, to reduce driver
liability, Uber and Lyft currently provide an auto
insurance policy with a $1-million coverage amount
and a $1,000 or $2,500 deductible, respectively, when
drivers’ ridesharing app is active. A lower deductible
may increase suppliers’ willingness to work.
H2d. Offering auto insurance with a lower
deductible is positively associated with suppliers’
willingness to work.

3.3. Information features
Information transparency features can increase
participation in electronic markets [20]. The third set of
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hypotheses explores how information features of a P2P
platform influence supplier participation. Some
ridesharing platforms provide a passenger rating
system and substitute phone numbers. A passenger
rating system allows suppliers to evaluate an individual
passenger, which contributes to a safer work
environment in the long run. A substitute phone
number function shows a dummy number to drivers
and passengers when they communicate with each
other. This feature helps both parties protect their
personal information and privacy. Consequently, other
things being equal, these information features are
expected to increase willingness to work.
H3a. Providing a passenger rating system on the
ridesharing service platform is positively associated
with suppliers’ willingness to work.
H3b. Providing a substitute phone number to
protect personal information is positively associated
with suppliers’ willingness to work.

3.4. Flexibility and security of alternative jobs
Finally, we explore the relationships between
characteristics of alternate jobs and the willingness to
work for ridesharing platforms. Many ridesharing
suppliers have other primary jobs, and the extent to
which they are willing to engage with the platform may
be affected by the flexibility and security of their other
job.
We conjecture that when drivers have a primary job
other than ridesharing, their interest in offering
ridesharing services may be contingent on the
flexibility of their primary job. For example, a more
flexible work schedule may make it easier to find the
time to offer ridesharing services. However, if the
flexibility of drivers’ primary job is high, due to their
preference for flexibility, they may want to keep
working in their primary job and work less for a
ridesharing service.
Another interesting empirical question is whether
the perceived security of the main job influences the
willingness to take on a ridesharing job. Applying
insights from security-potential and aspiration theory
[26], we expect that security-enhancing service
attributes will not increase the utility for a supplier if
that individual perceives the security of the alternative
main job to be sufficiently high. On the other hand, if
the alternative main job does not fulfill a minimum
level of security, the preference for a security-related
attribute of the ridesharing service will be higher.
Given the countervailing arguments, we propose a
negative association to be tested:
H4a. The perceived flexibility level of an
alternative job is negatively associated with suppliers’
willingness to work for the ridesharing service.

H4b. The perceived security level of an alternative
job is negatively associated with suppliers’ willingness
to work for the ridesharing service.

4. Data and research design
4.1. Data
We obtained online experimental data from
ridesharing suppliers in the United States using
Qualtrics online panels during April-May 2018. To
compare differences between active and inactive
drivers,2 samples of similar size for each group were
recruited (204 active and 202 inactive drivers). Each
sample is sufficiently larger than the required size
using standard sampling size requirements [25, 34].
The unit cost per completed response was $15.
Among 6,107 people who attempted to participate
in the experiment, 133 participants were not able to
proceed since they lived outside the United States.
3,933 people were screened out because they had not
worked for ridesharing services. 681 inactive drivers
were also screened out because the reasons they quit
offering ridesharing services were not related to the
work conditions. 489 people did not pass an attention
check, and another 485 people did not complete the
survey. The total number of data points obtained from
the 406 participants is 7,308 (406 participants × 6
choice sets × 3 options).
The mean age in the final sample is 36 years old,
and 54% are male. The proportion of individuals
holding undergraduate or graduate degrees is 47%,
which is higher than that of the U.S. population in
2017, according to the U.S. Census Bureau. 87% of
participants have driven for Uber and 52% for Lyft. On
average, they have driven 33.4 hours per week for 1.4
years. The average wage for ridesharing was $20.08
per hour. 37% of participants have an alternative
primary job(s) other than ridesharing. Overall, active
and inactive drivers have similar socio-demographic
characteristics. Active drivers generally show shorter
ridesharing experiences, shorter weekly driving hours,
and lower hourly wage than inactive drivers. Thus,
although the inactive drivers no longer drive, their
level of engagement with ridesharing was slightly
higher than that of current active drivers in the sample.

4.2. Method and dependent variables
To examine the effect of hypothetical work
2

Following Hall and Krueger [21], inactive drivers are defined as
drivers who have provided ridesharing services before but have not
done so for the most recent six or more months.

Page 6017

conditions on willingness to work, which is not
observable, a discrete choice experiment was designed
[46]. The key working conditions included in the
choice experiment are five contractual attributes
(minimum required driving hours per week, minimum
wage guarantee, company-sponsored health insurance,
company-sponsored retirement plan, and auto
insurance with different deductible levels), and two
information features (passenger rating system and
substitute phone number function).
There are three levels of minimum required weekly
driving hours (0, 20, and 40 hours), two levels of the
other six attributes, and two options composed of these
seven attributes in each choice set. A full factorial
experimental design would require (3×2×2×2×2×2×2)2
=36,864 choice sets for combinations of the seven
attributes, with multiple levels of each attribute and
two choice options. To keep the number manageable,
this study uses a fractional factorial design with six
choice scenarios through D-optimal design and the
OPTEX procedure.
To present participants with choice sets containing
more varied options, we generated four different
blocks which contain six choice sets. Each respondent
was randomly assigned to one of the four blocks. Six
choice sets were given in random order to avoid
choices being affected by the order of the choice sets.
The respondent first chooses Option 1, 2, or neither
(see Figure 2). If Option 1 or 2 is selected, the
respondent can decide to increase, decrease, or not
change driving hours and future work period. A
participant can choose not to work under conditions
described in the two options if the incremental utility
does not exceed that of the no-work option.
This choice experiment yields two types of
responses: discrete and ordered categorical data. The
dependent variables used to test H1, H2, and H3 are
discrete (i.e., 1 when an option is chosen and 0 when
the option is not chosen). The relative importance of
each work condition compared to the other conditions
in the choice set is examined by running a random
parameter logistic (RPL) regression model as follows:
!"#$ = !" ℎ"$% + '')"$% + !"#$

(1)

!"#$ is a binary utility variable equal to 1 for the
chosen option and 0 for unchosen options. This
equation presents individual i’s utility derived from
choosing an alternative a among available alternatives
in a choice set Cit and in choice situation t [27]. ℎ"#$ is
the minimum required weekly driving hours, and !"#$
is a vector composed of the other contractual and
information features of a ridesharing service. !" and !"
are assumed to be normally distributed random
parameters that are driver-specific.
The second type of responses, used to test H4, is

ordered categorical data which shows drivers’
willingness to change their participation rate, work
hours, and work duration. For the chosen work option,
the participant i replies whether her willingness to
work (Yiat) would decrease (Pr(Yiat=1)), not change
(Pr(Yiat=2)), or increase (Pr(Yiat=3)). We analyze the
responses using the following generalized ordinal
logistic regression model (e.g., [33]):
'
ln(!"#$
) = ln

! "#$ (&)
()! "#$ (&)

= "#$%& + (!"#$% &" + ⋯ + !)#$% &) )

(2)

X contains ridesharing attribute variables,
ridesharing pattern variables (hourly rate, weekly work
hours, percentage of income from ridesharing),
employment characteristics (perceived flexibility and
security of a primary job, whether the participant has a
health insurance and/or retirement plan) and individual
characteristics variables (age, gender, educational
attainment, annual income, annual household income,
household size, and race).

5. Results
We first test H1, H2, and H3 using the RPL model.
Results in Table 1 show that all working condition
attributes included in the choice set influence choices
in the expected directions. Drivers’ utility decreases
when the ridesharing platform requires minimum
driving hours (Hours). Their utility increases when the
company provides health insurance (Health), matches
with contributions all or some of drivers’ retirement
plan (Retirement), guarantees the city’s minimum wage
(Wage), or offers insurance with a smaller deductible
(Deductible). A passenger rating system for safer work
environments (Rating) and a substitute phone number
for privacy protection (Phone) also increase drivers’
utility. We also add an interaction term between Health
and Deductible to check if the two insurance benefits
may be perceived as a complement or substitute to
each other, but the interaction term was not significant.
The relatively large magnitude of coefficients on
Health, Wage, and Retirement, compared to
coefficients of other attributes, suggests these are
important factors to increase drivers’ willingness to
work for ridesharing platforms.
Regarding Phone, active drivers’ utility increases
when the platform provides dummy phone number to
passengers, helping drivers avoid unnecessary
interactions after completing a ride. However, inactive
drivers are not significantly affected by the availability
of this function. This implies that while a private
information protection function may not effectively
motivate inactive drivers to work, the platform
providing the private information protection function
raises active drivers’ willingness to work.
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Table 1. Parameter estimates from RPL
Variables
Hours
Health
Retirement
Wage
Deductible
Rating
Phone
Health ×
Deductible
Opt Out
N
Adj.pseudo Rsquared

-0.025
(0.006)
***
0.605
(0.085)
***
0.344
(0.064)
***
0.461
(0.051)
**
0.145
(0.068)
***
0.22
(0.046)
***
0.179
(0.051)
0.116
(0.1)
***
-2.322
(0.164)
406

Active
drivers
***
-0.033
(0.009)
***
0.526
(0.114)
***
0.269
(0.085)
***
0.459
(0.073)
0.141
(0.092)
***
0.225
(0.064)
***
0.288
(0.083)
0.067
(0.129)
***
-2.292
(0.221)
204

0.18

0.18

All drivers
***

Inactive
drivers
**
-0.019
(0.008)
***
0.616
(0.119)
***
0.392
(0.089)
***
0.506
(0.074)
0.132
(0.105)
***
0.184
(0.067)
0.078
(0.071)
0.215
(0.151)
***
-2.33
(0.239)
202
0.20

Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, ***p < .01; standard errors in
parentheses; the total number of observations is 7,308 (406
participants × 6 choice sets × 3 options)

By estimating wi (= !" /– !" ) using Equation (1),
drivers’ preferences for the attributes can be presented
in the unit of required driving hours for ridesharing,
which the drivers must relinquish for preferable
working conditions. Table 2 shows how many required
hours drivers are willing to work for ridesharing to
benefit from each attribute as a trade-off. On average,
drivers are willing to work for ridesharing for 8.1 hours
to benefit from a platform–sponsored health insurance,
6.5 hours to have access to a retirement plan, and 9.9
hours for a minimum wage guarantee. The interaction
term shows drivers are willing to additionally work for
11.7 hours to have a health insurance and lower
deductible at the same time. The willingness to work
for health insurance, a retirement plan, and a minimum
wage guarantee is higher for inactive drivers than for
active drivers, suggesting that inactive drivers demand
financial security more than active drivers, even
though they need to sacrifice flexibility.
To explore the relationship between the flexibility
and security of a driver’s primary job and the
willingness to work in a ridesharing job, we ran the
generalized ordinal logistic regression on drivers who
have other primary job(s) as employees, also known as
paid employed. 152 drivers (37.4% of all drivers), of
which 98 were active and 54 inactive, have another
primary job when working for ridesharing. The paid
employed evaluate the perceived flexibility and

Table 2. Willingness to work
Variable All drivers
***
Health
8.11
[4.4,11.8]
***
Retirement
6.52
[4.8,8.2]
***
Wage
9.86
[7.8,11.9]
Deductible
-0.48
[-3.3,2.4]
***
Rating
7.02
[5.3,8.8]
***
Phone
3.11
[0.8,5.4]
***
Health ×
11.67
Deductible [7.3,16.1]
N
406
Adj.pseudo
0.16
R-squared

Active drivers Inactive drivers
***
***
7.53
13.25
[4.6,10.5]
[7.4,19.1]
***
***
4.57
9.39
[2.4,6.8]
[6.1,12.7]
***
***
6.42
12.07
[3.9,9.0]
[8.0,16.2]
-0.08
-0.66
[-2.3,2.1]
[-5.3,4.0]
***
***
3.37
7.69
[1.4,5.4]
[3.8,11.5]
***
3.25
0.71
[1.0,5.5]
[-3.4,4.9]
***
***
4.95
10.15
[1.6,8.3]
[2.9,17.4]
204
202
0.18

0.20

Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, ***p < .01; [95% confidence
interval]; Note that the purpose of comparing active and
inactive drivers resides in recognizing differences in patterns
of each group’s preferences not in testing whether the
difference in two groups’ preferences is statistically significant.

security of their primary job using a scale of 1 to 4
following prior studies [33].3
Table 3 shows active and inactive drivers’
willingness to increase or decrease their work hours.
Overall, the probability of increasing or decreasing
active drivers’ anticipated working hours for
ridesharing4 is not significantly affected by perceived
flexibility nor by security of their primary job.
However, for inactive drivers the probability of
increasing their willingness to work is negatively
associated with flexibility and security of their primary
job. 5 This suggests that offering diversified work
conditions in the sharing economy may complement a
supplier’s low flexibility or security from their current
primary job.
3

Perceived flexibility of the alternative job is evaluated using the
question “How likely or unlikely do you think it is that you are able
to choose when, where, and for how long you work for your current
primary job?” based on the definition of job flexibility [23].
Following the previous literature [33] perceived security of the
alternative job is evaluated using the question “How likely or
unlikely do you think it is that you might lose your current primary
job for some reasons over the next twelve months?” and participants
reply to these questions by choosing one of the four levels of
likelihood: “Not at all likely,” “Not very likely,” “Quite likely,” or
“Very likely” [33].
4
For active drivers’ anticipated participation rate and working
period, the patterns of statistical significance on coefficients are
consistent with the result of working hours.
5
The coefficient of -10.4 is interpreted that the probability of
increasing inactive drivers’ willingness to work for ridesharing
decreases by 10.4% as the level of perceived flexibility increases by
one.
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Table 3. Generalized ordered logit estimation:
Paid employed
Working hours for ride-sharing
Inactive
Active drivers
drivers
Variables

Pr(Decrease) Pr(Increase)
Marginal
effects
(%)

z

Marginal
effects
(%)

Ridesharing attributes
***
Hours
0.8
5.4 -0.1
***
***
Health
-8.5
-4.3 8.2
*
*
Retirement -3.2
-1.9 3.1
***
***
Wage
-6.8
-4.6 6.5
*
Deductible -2.8
-1.8 2.7
***
Rating
-4.7
-2.8 1.1
***
***
Phone
-4.9
-3.3 4.7
Employment characteristics
Perceived
-3.4
-1.6 3.2
flexibility
Perceived
4.0
0.9 -2.1
security
N
676
Pseudo R0.16
squared

z

-0.6
4.3
1.9
4.6
1.8
0.7
3.3

Pr(Increase)
Marginal
effects
(%)

z

-0.1
-0.5
***
8.0
3.2
***
6.2
3.0
***
7.4
4.0
2.4
1.2
***
6.8
3.8
0.4
-0.2

1.6 -10.4
-0.9 -13.7

*

-1.7

***

-4.4

324
0.49

Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, ***p < .01; Controls: demographic
characteristics, ridesharing work patterns, other employment
characteristics; N (676, 324) is the number of responses from
98 active drivers and 54 inactive drivers, respectively. This
categorical data is not balanced as participants are asked to
report the willingness to change their work intention only if they
choose a work option.

6. Conclusion
6.1. Findings and contributions
In the discrete choice experiment, drivers reveal
their preferences by choosing options in choice sets
composed of flexibility, security, and information
features. We find that drivers’ willingness to work for
ridesharing generally increases when the ridesharing
company provides a minimum wage guarantee,
company-sponsored benefit plans, and information
features that protect drivers, although they may need to
relinquish flexibility by providing a ridesharing service
for minimum required working hours. The choice
experiment results suggest that providing higher
security in working conditions appeals particularly to
inactive drivers. More generally, platform companies
can focus on offering job security to lure inactive
suppliers back to the platform.
Regarding information attributes, we find that
active drivers value features that prevent unwanted
personal information disclosure more than inactive

drivers do. We also find a negative association between
inactive drivers’ willingness to work for ridesharing
and perceived flexibility and security of their primary
job. This relationship shows the sharing economy can
play a role in complementing low flexibility or security
in working conditions of a supplier’s main job.
Our findings make three contributions to the
research literature. First, this study extends existing
research by providing empirical evidence for platform
managers to identify which work conditions are
important to increase suppliers’ utility, which can
increase the supply of services in their platform. Prior
studies have mainly focused on the platform’s ownerdeveloper relationship or the platform’s ownerconsumer relationship. This study underscores the
importance of contracts between platform owners and
suppliers, viewing suppliers as active main players and
decision makers, rather than as passive players who
accept any work conditions. Second, this study adds to
the literature on information transparency. While
previous studies have primarily focused on B2B or
B2C markets, we investigate the effect of information
features which contribute to establishing trust in P2P
transactions on suppliers’ willingness to partner with a
platform. Third, this study contributes to the literature
on a recent perspective in labor economics asserting a
positive relationship between flexibility and security
(referred to as “flexicurity”). This approach has gained
traction in many countries as a possible response to the
new work conditions in the digital economy. Finally,
as far as we know, this is the first study to provide
empirical evidence on the potential complementarities
between the security of sharing economy suppliers’
main job and a sharing economy job with companysponsored benefit plans.
This study also offers practical implications that go
beyond ridesharing services. It helps design supplier
attraction and retainment strategies for companies that
might face conflicts related to suppliers’ working
conditions and concerns about the fairness of the
distribution of benefits from sharing economy services.
Granting the option to choose benefits and better
working conditions to suppliers can improve service
quantity and quality, enhance corporate image,
improve customer service, and ultimately lead to
higher profits.
Regulators and authorities should consider that a
large share of individuals (63% of participants in our
study) work for ridesharing as a primary means of
living. Considering that offering a minimum wage is
still one of the most important and controversial issues
for ridesharing platforms [50], policy makers could
introduce measures that require platforms to notify
suppliers whether they will earn the minimum wage or
not, and provide incentives for platform companies to
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improve their benefit plans. Moreover, considering
inactive drivers’ low concerns or lack of awareness
about the risk of personal information disclosure,
regulators should take more care of and monitor
potential related issues to prevent misuse of personal
information.

6.2. Directions for future research
This study only touches the surface of trade-offs in
working conditions for suppliers in the sharing
economy. We can think of two possible interesting
directions for future research. First, a longitudinal
study to observe actual supply decisions can
complement this study, since we could not capture
them in our cross-sectional design. Moreover, the
cross-sectional nature of the data makes it difficult to
establish reasonable conclusions on causality. Thus,
studies that capture dynamics between drivers’
decision to work and working conditions will provide
valuable insights.
Another avenue for future research is to study
additional working conditions that this study did not
capture. To minimize confusion across participants,
our experiment setting only contains core descriptions
of the choice experiment, avoiding much detailed
explanation of each work condition. For example,
drivers’ expectation of a standard health insurance
coverage may differ. Future studies may investigate
drivers’ work decision under more differentiated
benefit plan conditions.
In sum, this study increases our understanding of
the factors that motivate suppliers to join a platform
and increase their willingness to work. More generally,
there are tangible implications for platform design and
governance related to the trade-offs between offering
flexibility and security to suppliers in the sharing
economy.
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